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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the digital sex world, “roses” means dollars and “greek” refers to 
anal sex.1  Advertisements such as these run rampant: “15 Min $50 Roses 
. . . 1 hour $150 Roses,” and “How About A G-R-E-E-K Lesson I’m a 
Great Student!!”2  Other advertisements do not use code words: “HELLO 
GENETLEMEN NOW YOU MEET JADE AND TIPHANY WE DO 
TWO GIRL SHOWS AND INDIVISUAL CALLS!! WE GUARANTEE 
THE TIME OF YOUR LIFE!!!”3  These are the types of advertisements 
that Sheriff Thomas Dart of the Chicago Police Department frequently 
encountered when scrolling through the “Erotic Services” portion of the 
popular website, Craigslist.com (hereinafter “Craigslist”).4  Despite these 
shocking sex solicitations, a federal court in Illinois recently held that 
Craigslist was immune from suit despite allowing these advertisements 
on its website.5  How can such a blatant promise for sex be permitted 
through the Internet? The answer lies with the Communications Decency 
Act (hereinafter “CDA”).6 
Congress enacted the CDA to help promote the growth of the 
Internet and to encourage Web sites to self-police their content.7  With 
the intention of enforcing these policy goals, courts have extended the 
statutory immunity of the CDA immensely, creating what one court has 
called a “lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”8  The underlying 
purpose of these policy goals and the language of the statute, however, 
were not meant to immunize Web sites from engaging in illegal behavior 
or facilitating others in engaging in such behavior.9 
When Congress passed the CDA in 1996, the state of the Internet 
was significantly different than it is now.10  Over the past decade, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962–63 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. (spelling errors in original). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 966–69.. 
 6 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2009). 
 7 Id.; see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31, 333 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 
F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998); 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) 
(statements of Rep. Cox, Wyden, and Barton). 
 8 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 1164, n.15 (“The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication 
that could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and 
regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has become a dominant 
– perhaps the preeminent – means through which commerce is conducted. And its vast 
reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope 
of the immunity provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair 
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Internet has flourished to a point where such a broad concept of 
immunity under the CDA is not as imperative as it was in the Internet’s 
early stages.11  It is therefore appropriate to reconsider the overwhelming 
sweep of immunity granted toWeb sites by previous courts. 
Two recent cases demonstrate how courts have applied this 
seemingly limitless concept of immunity: Doe v. SexSearch.com 
(hereinafter “SexSearch”)12 and Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. (hereinafter 
“Dart”).13  Both of these cases arose from an “adult” website or an 
“adult” section of a website.  Each of these cases had egregious facts and 
claims.  The harsh result—denying the injured parties relief against these 
Web sites—is hard to justify given the general policy concerns regarding 
sexual crimes involving minors and prostitution.14  These cases 
demonstrate the need for a more factually intensive inquiry before 
immunity is granted. 
Part II of this Note sets forth the legislative background of the 
CDA, including the language of the statute and the policy reasons for 
enacting it.  This part examines the first case to interpret the CDA’s § 
230 immunity, Zeran v. America Online (hereinafter “Zeran”),15 and 
analyzes how courts have construed and expanded that decision.  Part III 
discusses the facts and holdings of the two cases central to this note: 
SexSearch and Dart.  These cases demonstrate the harsh results that flow 
from granting broad immunity without consideration for the facts and 
circumstances of the case.  Part IV analyzes Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommate.com, LLC (hereinafter “Roommate”) and explores how the 
court delved into a deeper factual analysis in that case rather than blindly 
granting the Web site blanket immunity for its actions.16 
Finally, Part V articulates a new test, which courts should consider 
when determining whether CDA immunity is appropriate.  The principles 
announced in Roommate seek to limit the breadth of immunity available 
and thus present a step in the right direction; however, these principles 
need to be expanded to allow courts to intervene and preclude immunity 
                                                                                                                                     
advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general 
applicability.”). 
 11 Id. 
 12 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412 (6th 
Cir. 2008). 
 13 No. 09-C1385, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97596 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2009). 
 14 See Jessica S. Groppe, Comment, A Child’s Playground or a Predator’s Hunting 
Ground? – How to Protect Children on Internet Social Networking Sites, 16 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 215, 217–24 (2007) (arguing that curbing sexual solicitation of minors on 
the Internet is a high priority). 
 15 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 16 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
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when necessary.  The best way to effectuate Congress’s intent in passing 
the CDA is to conduct a fact-specific inquiry, in which the court 
considers the nature of the Web site at issue, the underlying facts of the 
case, and the claims brought by the plaintiff. 
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CDA  
A. Legislative Background 
Congress passed the CDA as an amendment to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.17  The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 was passed “to promote competition and reduce regulation in order 
to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of 
new telecommunications technologies.”18  The CDA was therefore one 
small piece of a much larger statute. The portion of the statute referred to 
as the CDA is entitled, “Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of 
Offensive Material.”19  Under this title, the CDA states, “no provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”20  The CDA provides immunity when three specific 
requirements are met.21 
First, the defendant must be a “provider or user of an interactive 
computer service.”22  An interactive computer service is defined as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, 
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the 
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or 
educational institutions.”23  The most common interactive computer 
services are Web sites because they provide a service that enables 
multiple users to access the service.24  Therefore, this requirement is 
generally easily met.25 
                                                                                                                                     
 17 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2009). 
 18 Id. 
 19 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2009). 
 20 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2009). 
 21 Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 22 Id. 
 23 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
 24 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, n.6 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 25 Id. The Web sites at issue in this note, SexSearch.com, Craigslist.com, and 
Roommate.com, are all information content providers. 
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Second, the claim must be based on “information provided by 
another information content provider.”26  An information content 
provider is defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole 
or in part, for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”27  In any 
given situation, there may be more than one information content 
provider.28  Users of the Web site and the Web sites themselves can both 
be information content providers.29  Thus, a Web site may 
simultaneously be an interactive computer service provider when it 
passively displays information, and an information content provider 
when it creates or develops content.30  Whenever a Web site acts as an 
information content provider, it subjects itself to liability for the 
information that it created or developed.31 
Finally, the claim must treat the defendant “as [a] publisher or 
speaker” of that information even though it was provided by an outside 
“information content provider.”32  On its face the CDA does not define 
the terms “publisher” and “speaker.”33  However, subsequent courts have 
read the terms as requiring that the claim must treat the defendant as if he 
were the one who created or presented the information.34 
The CDA was passed with two primary objectives: Congress 
wanted to encourage the growth of the Internet through fostering free 
speech and removing the potentially stifling liability in this area,35 and 
Congress wanted to “encourage interactive computer services and users 
of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other 
offensive material. . . .”36  Congress’s specific findings and policy 
objectives are listed within the statute to make its intent clear to the 
                                                                                                                                     
 26 Universal Commc’n. Sys., 478 F.3d at 418. 
 27 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
 28 See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1165. 
 29 Id. (“The fact that users are information content providers does not preclude 
Roommate from also being an information content provider by helping ‘develop’ at least 
‘in part’ the information in the profiles. . . [T]he party responsible for putting information 
online may be subject to liability, even if the information originated with a user.”); see 
also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 30 Id. at 1162–63; see also Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262–63 
(N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 33 See generally, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f). 
 34 See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 421–22. 
 35 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027; Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 36 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; 
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998); 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Rep. Cox, Wyden, and Barton). 
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courts.37  The impetus to propose CDA immunity also came from two 
court cases that illustrated the disparity of treatment of interactive 
computer services under common law principles.38  Under common law, 
interactive computer services can be treated as either publishers or 
distributors when they supply third-party content to their users.39  The 
distinguishing factor between being considered a publisher or a 
distributor is the amount of control that the service has over the content 
that it publishes.40  A publisher is responsible for the creation and editing 
of its publication and is thus responsible for the content of its work.41  A 
distributor, on the other hand, is only responsible for distributing material 
and is thus not liable for the content of its publication unless it knew or 
had reason to know of defamatory content.42  The most well-known 
example of a distributor is a bookstore, because a bookstore does not 
exert any control over the contents of the books that it sells.43 
                                                                                                                                     
 37 Congress’s findings include: “The rapidly developing array of Internet and other 
interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an 
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to 
our citizens.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1); “[t]hese services offer users a great degree of 
control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater 
control in the future as technology develops.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2); “[t]he Internet and 
other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3); “[t]he Internet and other interactive 
computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4); “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on 
interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment 
services.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(5). Congress’s policy reasons behind the CDA include: “to 
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services and other interactive media.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1); “to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); “to 
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and 
other interactive computer services.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3); “to remove disincentives for 
the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower 
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal 
laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5). 
 38 Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). See also, H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996); Thomas D. Huycke, 
Note, Licensed Anarchy: Anything Goes on the Internet? Revisiting the Boundaries of 
Section 230 Protection, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 581, 583–86 (2009). 
 39 Huycke, supra note 37, at 583. 
 40 Id. at 583–84. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140. 
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In Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., Compuserve obtained 
information from third parties, used the information to compile an 
electronic rumor publication, and posted the publication on its bulletin 
board.44  The publication contained defamatory statements about the 
plaintiff, who then sued Compuserve for libel.45  The court held that 
Compuserve was akin to a distributor, as opposed to a publisher, because 
it did not review the contents of the publication before the publication 
was uploaded.46  Therefore, since the plaintiff did not prove knowledge 
or a reason to know of the defamatory content, Compuserve was not 
found liable.47 
The opposite conclusion was reached in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co. (hereinafter “Stratton”).48  In Stratton, an 
investment banking firm sued a Web site based on defamatory statements 
about the firm, which were posted on the Web site’s electronic bulletin 
board.49  The court held that the Web site was a publisher because it 
claimed to exercise “editorial control over the content of messages 
posted on its computer bulletin boards[.]”50  Due to its status as a 
publisher, the Web site was found liable.51 
Read together, these decisions may be taken to establish that 
interactive computer services will not be held liable if they do not police 
their Web sites and do not know or have reason to know of tortious 
activity, but they will be held liable if they do police their Web sites.52  In 
effect, these decisions support the policy that Web sites should maintain 
a “hands-off” approach and avoid ensuring the safety of their sites. In 
order to set aside the deterrent to monitor one’s Web site, Congress 
enacted the CDA to immunize interactive computer services from suits 
based on information provided by third parties that have been published 
by the Web site.53  In reference to Internet-based suits, Congress 
                                                                                                                                     
 44 Id. at 137. 
 45 Id. at 137–38. 
 46 Id. at 141. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 49 Id. at *1, 4. 
 50 Id. at *3, 6–11. 
 51 Id. at *10–11. 
 52 Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 229, at *6–11. 
 53 See H.R. REP. NO. 104–58 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“[S]ection [230] provides ‘Good 
Samaritan’ protections from civil liability for providers . . . of an interactive computer 
service for actions to restrict . . . access to objectionable online material. One of the 
specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other 
similar decisions which have treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of 
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abolished the difference between distributor and publisher liability found 
at common law.54  Congress sought to allow interactive computer 
services to perform some editing and policing of user-generated content 
without holding them liable for all of the unlawful or defamatory 
messages that they did not find and delete.55  Congress also sought to 
protect the good faith removal of any material that was viewed as 
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected.”56  Therefore, although Congress sought to protect Web sites 
engaging in an effort to cleanse their Web sites of illegal or inappropriate 
material, there is no indication in the statute that Congress intended to 
immunize Web sites that knew of illegal or defamatory material on their 
Web sites and refused to remove the material.57 
B. Zeran v. America Online 
The Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online presented the first 
interpretation by an appellate court of the CDA.58  In this case, the 
plaintiff, Zeran, sought to hold America Online (hereinafter “AOL”) 
liable for defamatory messages posted on AOL’s bulletin board by an 
unidentified third party.59  The postings advertised shirts with tasteless 
slogans referencing the Oklahoma City bombing and told interested 
parties to contact the plaintiff, Zeran, at his home phone number.60  As a 
result of these messages, Zeran received multiple threatening phone calls 
that intensified further when a local radio host talked about the 
advertisements during his radio show.61  Zeran notified AOL about the 
defamatory postings.  Eventually, AOL took the postings down but 
refused to post a retraction.62 
                                                                                                                                     
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable 
material.”). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (“Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, 
not the creation of the content.”) (emphasis in original). 
 56 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 57 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2009). 
 58 See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 59 Id. at 328. 
 60 Id. at 329. 
 61 Id. Zeran was a completely innocent victim of defamation, which resulted in an 
exorbitant number of death threats. Even after the radio show and a local newspaper 
revealed that the advertisements were a hoax, Zeran was still receiving fifteen outraged 
phone calls per day. Id. 
 62 Id. 
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The Fourth Circuit held that AOL was immune from suit even 
though it was notified of the statements because AOL is an interactive 
computer service, and the plaintiff sought to hold AOL liable as a 
publisher for the postings provided by an outside information content 
provider.63  Zeran argued that he was seeking to hold AOL liable for 
being a distributor rather than a publisher, because AOL knew of the 
defamatory postings.64  He supported his argument by stating that 
Congress only meant to protect publishers under the CDA, based on the 
language of the statute, and that the statute left distributors unprotected.65  
The court held that the distinction between distributor liability and 
publisher liability is immaterial because both are merely subsets of 
publisher liability.66  The terms “publisher” and “distributor” derive their 
meanings from defamation law.67  For purposes of defamation law, both 
publishers and distributors are considered to be “publishers” because 
they provide information to the public, regardless of their knowledge of 
the material.68  The different nomenclature signifies only “the different 
standards of liability [that] may be applied within the larger publisher 
category, depending on the specific type of publisher concerned.”69  The 
court reasoned that once a website receives notice of a potentially 
defamatory posting, the Web site assumes the role of a traditional 
publisher.70  Thus, the court held, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or 
alter content—are barred.”71 
Since the decision in Zeran, many courts throughout the country 
have used the case’s analysis to advance a broad interpretation of 
immunity.72  Some courts have granted immunity to defendants even if 
they take an active role in selecting and posting defamatory material, as 
long as someone else wrote the original material.73  This broad 
                                                                                                                                     
 63 Id. at 332–33. 
 64 Id. at 331. 
 65 Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 331–32. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 332. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 332. 
 71 Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330. The Zeran court’s holding that publishers and distributors 
should both be considered publishers under the CDA was upheld in Barrett v. Rosenthal 
146 P.3d 510 at 518–20 (Cal. 2006). 
 72 See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 
F. Supp. 2d 681, 690 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (listing cases that have stated that Section 
230(c)(1) offers information computer services a “broad,” and “robust” immunity). 
 73 See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 
P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
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interpretation can partially be attributed to the Zeran court’s 
characterization of publisher liability.74  The conflation of the roles of 
publisher and distributor is troubling given that the statutory language of 
the CDA specifically uses the term “publisher,” to the exclusion of the 
term “distributor.”75  The CDA states: “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information. . . .” 76  Therefore, Congress arguably only meant to 
grant immunity to Web sites when they are being treated as traditional 
publishers, instead of being treated as either publishers or distributors. 
Despite the overwhelming majority of courts advocating a broad 
grant of immunity, some courts have recently taken the view that Zeran 
has been applied too broadly.77  Many scholars argue that the breadth of 
immunity has become too large and out of control.78  These courts and 
scholars espouse taking a more comprehensive view of the entire case 
before granting immunity for every kind of action regardless of how 
active the interactive computer service is in the creation or development 
of the material provided. 
                                                                                                                                     
 74 Zeran, 129 F. 3d at 330. 
 75 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2009). 
 76 Id. (emphasis added) 
 77 See Doe v. GTE, 347 F. 3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (The Seventh Circuit stated 
that § 230(c)(1) should be read as a “definitional clause rather than as an immunity from 
liability . . . . The difference between this reading and [the courts that consider it to be a 
clause granting immunity] is that § 230(c)(2) never requires ISPs (interactive service 
providers) to filter offensive content, and thus § 230(e)(3) would not preempt state laws 
or common-law doctrines that induce or require ISPs to protect the interests of third 
parties, [] for such laws would not be ‘inconsistent with’ this understanding of § 
230(c)(1).”); see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, 519 F. 3d  at 
669–70 (citing and agreeing with the proposition in Doe v. GTE that § 230(c)(1) was 
meant to be a “definitional clause.”); Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that the 
interpretation of the substance of section 230(c) should be consistent with the title of the 
section, “Protection of ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material” 
and thus § 230(c)(1) should be considered a definitional clause.) 
 78 See, e.g., Huycke, supra note 37, at 596 (“[C]ourts analyzing Section 230 routinely 
ignore Congress’s definition of an [information content provider] to find [interactive 
computer services] immunized even if they alter, manipulate, select or facilitate third 
party content, simply because the content originated with the third party.”); Katy Noeth, 
Note, The Never-Ending Limits of § 230: Extending ISP Immunity to the Sexual 
Exploitation of Children, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 765, 769 (2008) (“The end result is that 
courts have expanded § 230 to immunize [interactive computer services] from virtually 
every tort action.”). 
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III. SEXSEARCH AND DART 
A. Doe v. SexSearch 
One instance of a court granting broad immunity to an undeserving 
defendant is Doe v. SexSearch.79  In SexSearch, the Web site at issue 
offers an adult dating service that encouraged its members to meet and 
have sex.80  Plaintiff John Doe met Jane Roe on SexSearch’s Web site, 
and pursuant to conversations and plans made through the Web site, the 
two met at Roe’s home and engaged in sexual relations.81  Although Roe 
represented herself to be eighteen years-old in her profile on the website, 
she was in fact fourteen at the time of the meeting.82  As a result of the 
sexual relations, Doe was arrested and charged with engaging in 
unlawful conduct with a minor.83 Doe then sued SexSearch alleging 
breach of contract, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, violations of the Ohio 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, and failure to warn.84  These claims 
ultimately boiled down to whether “(a) [d]efendants failed to discover 
Jane Roe lied about her age to join the website, or (b) the contract terms 
[were] unconscionable.”85 
In granting immunity, the court rejected plaintiff’s arguments that 
SexSearch is an information content provider because the Web site 
reserves the power to alter and delete the content of profiles that disobey 
the profile guidelines.86  Furthermore, the court denied the argument that 
CDA immunity can only be granted to defendants when faced with 
defamation claims.87  The court held that SexSearch is an interactive 
computer service and not an information content provider.88  In addition, 
the court held that the suit brought by Doe sought to hold SexSearch 
liable for acting as a publisher in publishing information provided by a 
third party.89  The Court rejected Doe’s reliance on Anthony v. Yahoo! 
Inc. (hereinafter “Anthony”)90 in determining that SexSearch is not an 
                                                                                                                                     
 79 Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 80 Id. 
 81 SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 722. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 723–24. 
 85 SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 724. 
 86 Id. at 725–26. 
 87 Id. at 726. 
 88 Id. at 725–26. 
 89 Id. at 726–27. 
 90 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In Anthony, the interactive computer 
service at issue consisted of two dating services that were subsections of Yahoo!  The 
plaintiff alleged that Yahoo! produced false member profiles and that it distributed 
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information content provider.91  The court distinguished Anthony because 
in Anthony, the defendant Web site created the tortious content itself, but 
in SexSearch, plaintiff did not allege that SexSearch created false 
information or modified Jane Roe’s profile.92  The court further relied on 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc. (hereinafter “Carafano”)93 and held 
that despite the fact that SexSearch provided the questionnaire that Roe 
answered falsely, that fact is not enough to prove that SexSearch is the 
developer of the false profile.94 
The court in SexSearch also relied on the reasoning from Doe v. 
MySpace, (hereinafter “MySpace”),95 to grant immunity to SexSearch. In 
MySpace, plaintiff Julie Roe sued MySpace, alleging the defendant 
negligently failed to monitor its Web site.96  MySpace is a social 
networking site that allows individuals to create profiles and 
communicate with other users.97  Plaintiff Julie Doe met Peter Solis 
through MySpace and the two exchanged contact information.98  Doe and 
Solis arranged a meeting in person, during which Solis sexually assaulted 
Doe.99  At the time of the meeting, Doe was fourteen years-old and Solis 
was nineteen.100  Doe had created her MySpace profile and originally met 
Solis when she was thirteen, in violation of MySpace’s minimum age 
requirement.101  The court found that despite Doe’s claim that the Web 
site negligently failed to keep minors off the website, Doe was really 
seeking to hold MySpace responsible for publishing the content of her 
profile, which led to her attack.102  Therefore, the court granted immunity 
to MySpace.103  Relying on this reasoning, the court in SexSearch held 
that Doe was seeking to hold SexSearch liable for failure to monitor its 
                                                                                                                                     
former members’ profiles that had discontinued their service to its current members to 
retain their service. Yahoo! was found to be liable for both the false profiles and the 
former profiles. SexSearch distinguished the false profiles in Anthony from Roe’s profile, 
but it did not consider the misrepresentations associated with the former profiles. 
 91 SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 725. 
 92 Id. 
 93 339 F.3d 1119 (9th. Cir. 2003). 
 94 SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 725–26. 
 95 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413, 415–16 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
 96 MySpace, 528 F.3d at 416. 
 97 Id. at 415. 
 98 Id. at 416. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 . Id. 
 102 Myspace, 528 F.3d at 419–20. 
 103 Id. at 420–22. 
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website for the publication of third-party content and for failure to keep 
minors off its website.104 
The court’s reliance on MySpace indicates that if the facts in 
SexSearch were different, and the plaintiff in the case was really Jane 
Roe, the court would have still found SexSearch to be immune from suit. 
SexSearch and MySpace stand for the same proposition: regardless of the 
underlying facts of the suit, if the claims brought against a Web site seek 
to hold it liable for failing to monitor the content provided by third 
parties, then the Web site will be immune.  While it is true that an adult 
male is not the most sympathetic plaintiff in a suit against a sex Web site 
seeking to hold it liable for his actions, the claims and underlying facts at 
issue still implicate the sexual assault of a minor. 
The district court in SexSearch went on to conduct an analysis of 
the merits of each of the claims and found that regardless of the CDA 
immunity, none of the claims stated a basis upon which relief could be 
granted.105  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the 
claims on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) grounds,106 but the 
court did not address whether SexSearch was immune from suit under 
the CDA.107  The Sixth Circuit stated that it did not adopt the lower 
court’s analysis of immunity because the District Court “read § 230 more 
broadly than any previous Court of Appeals decision has read it, 
potentially abrogating all state- or common-law causes of action brought 
against interactive Internet services.”108 
 B. Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. 
In Dart v. Craigslist, Inc.,109 plaintiff, Sheriff Thomas Dart of the 
Chicago Police Department, sought to hold Craigslist liable for the 
contents of the “Erotic Services” portion of its Web site.110  Craigslist is a 
Web site that publishes millions of classified advertisements for various 
things, such as housing, jobs, dating, used items, and communication 
information.111  The Web site is divided into categories and subcategories 
established by Craigslist to help streamline its users’ interests.112  The 
content of the ads and the selection of where to place their ads are 
                                                                                                                                     
 104 Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 105 Id. at 728–37. 
 106 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 107 Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 108 Id. The Sixth Circuit did not elaborate on why the lower court had read the statute 
so broadly and why it refused to affirm the lower court’s granting of immunity. 
 109 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 962. 
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provided by the users of the website.113  Users posting any content on the 
Web site must agree to abide by Craigslist’s “Terms of Use.”114  
Craigslist also provides a search engine that permits users to search 
through ads using a word-search function.115  The area at issue in this 
case was the subcategory of “services” within the “erotic” category (now 
the “adult” category).116  Whenever users access this part of the Web site, 
they receive an additional “warning & disclaimer” in which they must 
agree to flag as “prohibited” any information that violates Craigslist’s 
Terms of Use, including “offers for or the solicitation of prostitution.”117  
In this case, the plaintiff, Thomas Dart, the sheriff of Cook County, 
stated that prostitution is rampant on Craigslist and claimed that 
Craigslist’s “Erotic Services” category serves as a public nuisance.118  To 
support this claim, Dart alleged that Craigslist violates federal, state and 
local prostitution laws by “solicit[ing] for a prostitute,” by “‘arranging’ 
meetings of persons for purposes of prostitution and ‘direct[ing]’ persons 
to places of prostitution,” and by making it easier for prostitutes, pimps, 
and patrons to conduct business.119 
The court found that Craigslist was entitled to a dismissal based on 
CDA immunity.120  The court held that Craigslist is an interactive 
computer service,121 and it is not an information content provider with 
regard to the illegal information.122  In addition, the court held that 
plaintiff’s claims sought to hold Craigslist liable as the publisher or 
speaker of information created by others.123  The court specifically 
rejected the arguments that “Craigslist knowingly ‘arranges’ meetings for 
the purpose of prostitution and ‘directs’ people to places of prostitution,” 
and that Craigslist “provid[es] the contact information of prostitutes and 
brothels.”124  Therefore, regardless of the underlying illegal content 
Craigslist provided, the court precluded claims that the Web site should 
be liable for its function as the publisher of the information.125  The court 
further held that Craigslist does not induce users to post illegal material 
                                                                                                                                     
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Dart,  665 F. Supp. at 962. 
 116 Id. at 961–62. 
 117 Id. at 962. 
 118 Id. at 963. This case specifically concerns “chicago.craigslist.org,” one of the 
region-specific webpages on Craigslist’s website. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 965–69. 
 121 Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 965. 
 122 Id. at 967–69. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 967. 
 125 Id. 
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by providing an “adult services” section,126 stating that the word-search 
function is a “neutral tool” also subject to immunity.127 
In both of these cases, the courts used a broad interpretation of 
immunity without considering the nature of the underlying Web sites and 
the Web sites’ efforts to elicit dangerous and potentially illegal 
information.  The courts used the same tunnel vision to grant immunity 
as the majority of the courts have used before them, instead of seeking to 
tie the facts to the purpose behind the law.  The Ninth Circuit 
reconsidered this restricting outlook in Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 
LLC. 
IV. ROOMMATE 
A. Case Summary 
The seminal case that represents a shift away from granting broad 
immunity is Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, LLC.128  Plaintiffs, the Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley and the Fair Housing Council 
of San Diego, brought suit against Roommate.com for various violations 
of the Fair Housing Act and California housing discrimination laws.129  
Defendant Roommate.com runs a Web site “designed to match people 
renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to live.”130  To 
use the Web site, individuals must create profiles by answering questions 
provided by Roommate.com about themselves and their roommate 
preferences, using pre-selected answers from a drop-down menu, and 
writing in an optional “Additional Comments” section in which there are 
no pre-selected answers and individuals can write anything they desire.131  
The questions posed by the Web site ask about an individual’s sex, 
familial status, sexual orientation, and about the user’s preferences in 
regards to those characteristics.132  These questions must be answered as 
a prerequisite to using the Web site.133  The Web site allows users to 
search the listings by entering their preferences into a search engine that 
returns listings that correspond to their preferences.134  The Web site 
                                                                                                                                     
 126 Id. at 967–69. 
 127 Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 969. (The court relied on the standard advanced by 
Roommate, 521 F.3d 1157, that is further explained in Part IV.) 
 128 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 129 Id. at 1162. 
 130 Id. at 1161. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1162. 
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further provides an email service for which users must pay an additional 
fee to receive periodic emails from Roommate.com; the emails suggest 
available housing options that meet the users’ preferences.135   
Plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Housing Act and other state 
laws pertaining to housing discrimination.136  Defendant contended that it 
was immune from suit under the CDA.137  Plaintiffs conceded that 
Roommate.com is an interactive computer service, establishing the first 
element of immunity.138  The district court granted CDA immunity to 
that defendant Roommate.com for all of the Fair Housing Act violations 
and California housing discrimination violations alleged against it 
because it was not an information content provider.139  The case was then 
appealed and reviewed twice by the Ninth Circuit.140  In a panel decision, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld only partial immunity for the Web site,141 
though in an en banc decision, it found that Roommate.com was not 
immune from suit for some of the violations alleged against it.142 
In the panel decision, the court set forth a fragmented opinion on 
what aspects of the website that Roommate.com was entitled to 
immunity for.143  Judge Kozinski divided the analysis into three issues: 
the questionnaires that users were forced to fill out; the completed users’ 
profiles; and the “Additional Comments” portion of the users’ profiles.144  
In considering the first issue, all the judges agreed that Roommate.com 
was an information content provider because it created the questions and 
answer choices.145  The second issue—whether the users’ answers that 
were published as their profiles were subject to CDA immunity—
provided a more difficult issue for the judges.146  The majority opined 
that Roommate.com was not immune for the users’ profiles because it 
actively solicited and processed them.147  The majority drew a distinction 
between the facts in this case and the facts in Carafano by stating that the 
Carafano court did not grant immunity “to those who actively 
                                                                                                                                     
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1162, n.6. 
 139 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, No. 03-09386, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27987 (Cent. D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2004). 
 140 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007); rev’d 
en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 141 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 142 Roommate, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 143 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 926–27. 
 146 Id. at 927–29. 
 147 Id. 
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encourage, solicit and profit from the tortious and unlawful 
communication of others.”148  The majority further reasoned that by 
providing a search mechanism and e-mail service, Roommate.com 
provides an “additional layer of information that it is ‘responsible’ at 
least ‘in part’ for creating or developing.”149  The majority, however, 
found that Roommate.com was immune from liability for the content of 
users’ “Additional Comments” sections.150  The court found that the 
difference between the “Additional Comments” section and the rest of 
the users’ profiles was that the “Additional Comments” section lacked 
the specific encouragement by Roommate.com to provide discriminatory 
information.151 
Two judges dissented.  One judge on the panel argued that the 
majority had gone too far in stripping immunity from Roommate.com.  
However, another judge argued that the majority had not gone far enough 
and believed that Roommate.com should have been completely stripped 
of immunity.152  Specifically, Judge Reinhardt dissented from the 
majority in arguing that Roommate.com should not have been granted 
immunity for the “Additional Comments” section; he believed that the 
comments were an integral part of the discriminatory users’ profiles, and 
the site actively solicited and encouraged individuals to post 
discriminatory comments in that section.153  Judge Reinhardt looked at 
the users’ profiles as a whole, in contrast to the majority that examined 
each section of the profiles separately.154 
Judge Ikuta concurred with the majority in granting immunity for 
the “Additional Comments” section and dissented from the decision not 
to grant immunity to Roommate.com for the content of the users’ 
profiles.155  She argued that the majority adopted an overly expansive 
interpretation of “information content provider” unsupported by case 
law, and that Roommate.com did not become an information content 
provider by soliciting specific type of information.156 
Five months later, the Ninth Circuit heard the case en banc.  The 
court upheld the panel’s findings that Roommate.com was an 
information content provider with respect to the questions posed during 
                                                                                                                                     
 148 Id. at 927–28. 
 149 Roommate, 489 F.3d at 929. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 930–35. 
 153 Id. at 930–33 (Reinhardt J., dissenting). 
 154 Id. at 931. 
 155 Roommate, 489 F.3d at 933–35. 
 156 Id. at 933–35. 
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the registration process and the profiles created from those questions.157  
The court reasoned that even though users are information content 
providers in principle, that does not preclude Roommate.com or any 
other interactive computer service from also being an information 
content provider “by helping ‘develop’ at least ‘in part’ the information 
in the profiles.”158  The court further stated that “Roommate is 
‘responsible’ at least ‘in part’ for each subscriber’s profile page, because 
every such page is a collaborative effort between Roommate and the 
subscriber.”159 
The court next considered Roommate.com’s search system and e-
mail notification system, holding that Roommate.com acted as an 
information content provider with respect to both systems.160  The court 
sought to define the term “develop,” which had not been analyzed in the 
panel’s decision.161  The court carefully considered the language of the 
statute and stated that “develop” must have an additional meaning other 
than “create;” otherwise, the use of both words in the statute would have 
been superfluous.162  The court set forth a definition of “develop” by 
stating, “a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls 
within the exception to § 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged 
illegality of the conduct.”163  By allowing users to search based on illegal 
preferences and sending e-mails pursuant to these preferences, 
Roommate.com was no longer a passive conduit, but instead a partial 
“developer” of the information.164  The court stated, “[i]f Roommate.com 
has no immunity for asking discriminatory questions, as we concluded 
above, it can certainly have no immunity for using the answers to the 
unlawful questions to limit who has access to housing.”165 
                                                                                                                                     
 157 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164–67 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 158 Id. at 1165. (The court stated that requiring subscribers to answer the questions as 
a condition of using Roommate’s services unlawfully “cause[s]” subscribers to make a 
“statement . . . with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates [a] preference, 
limitation, or discrimination,” in violation of [the Fair Housing Act]. The CDA does not 
grant immunity for inducing third parties to express illegal preferences.”)  See also Batzel 
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 159 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1167. 
 160 Id. at 1167–72. 
 161 Id. at 1166–68. 
 162 Id.; See also FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 163 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1168. 
 164 Id. at 1167. 
 165 Id. (The court sought to distinguish the search engine at issue from generic search 
engines, such as Google and Yahoo! because the search functions used by these search 
engines do not “develop” the information sufficiently to meet the court’s announced 
rule). 
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The court then analyzed the “Additional Comments” section of 
users’ profiles and upheld the panel’s decision that Roommate.com was 
immune for that section.166  The court characterized the “Additional 
Comments” as a neutral tool, which was fully protected by CDA 
immunity.167  The court’s analysis of the “Additional Comments” section 
focused on the proclaimed definition of “develop” set forth in the 
decision.168 
B. Case Analysis 
The analysis of whether a Web site should qualify as an 
information content provider, advanced in Roommate, is a step in the 
right direction for adhering to Congress’s goals in passing the CDA.169  
The decision does not affect Congress’s attempts to avoid disincentives 
to self-police Web sites.  Roommate.com contributed to the content of 
the discriminatory information, and thus, this case did not present an 
issue of self-policing material provided by other information content 
providers.170  Furthermore, this decision does not affect the policy goal of 
providing for the free flow of the Internet. Roommate portrays the 
outward limits of allowing the free flow of the Internet.  
The court creates a clear divide by drawing the line between the 
profiles created through questions posed by Roommate.com, the e-mail 
notification, and search system, on the one hand, and the “Additional 
Comments” section, on the other.  The court announced the rule that 
whenever the Web-site helps to “develop,” at least “in part,” the illegal 
information provided, it transforms from a passive conduit into a 
responsible party that does not receive immunity.171  However, providing 
a forum in which individuals can provide information on their own, such 
as the “Additional Comments” section, does not pass this threshold 
without some kind of active inducement of the supplied content.172  
                                                                                                                                     
 166 Id. at 1173–74. 
 167 Id. at 1174. (“Roommate publishes these comments as written . . . . [it] is not 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this content, which comes 
entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by Roommate.”) 
 168 Id. 
 169 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1170, 1175. 
 170 Id. at 1170. (“Here, Roommate is not being sued for removing some harmful 
messages while failing to remove others; instead, it is being sued for the predictable 
consequences of creating a website designed to solicit and enforce housing preferences 
that are alleged to be illegal.”) 
 171 Id. at 1166. 
 172 Id. at 1173–74. See also FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 
2009) (This distinction can be more readily observable through the analogy, “[w]e would 
not ordinarily say that one who builds a highway is ‘responsible’ for the use of that 
highway by a fleeing bank robber, even though the culprit’s escape was facilitated by the 
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The Ninth Circuit, in the en banc decision, also sought to explain 
and distinguish previous case law to further develop its rule.  In 
considering the previous case of Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,173 
the court affirmed the grant CDA immunity to the Web site while stating 
that some of the case’s reasoning was incorrect.174  In Carafano, the 
court granted immunity to a dating Web site that had published an 
unauthorized profile created by an unknown party.175  The profile 
contained an actress’s personal information, which led to threatening 
phone calls.176  In Roommate, the court stated that the Carafano court 
properly granted immunity because the dating Web site did not induce 
the illegal content, but rather provided neutral tools to individuals who 
independently created illegal content.177  However, the Carafano court 
was incorrect in stating that “no [dating] profile has any content until a 
user actively creates it,” and finding that a website may still be granted 
immunity if it asked questions and provided drop down answers that then 
created users’ profiles.178  The Ninth Circuit stated in Roommate that 
“even if the data [is] supplied by third parties, a Web site operator may 
still contribute to the content’s illegality and thus be liable as a 
developer.”179 
The analysis set forth in Roommate considers the amount of control 
and input an interactive service provider has in creating information.  
The Ninth Circuit created a sliding scale to determine how much 
information a Web site can solicit before losing immunity.  The 
Roommate decision is a good example of a court considering the facts 
and claims at issue in the case, as opposed to blindly granting broad 
immunity. 
Since the decision in Roommate, many courts have followed the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning,180 but some courts have rejected Roommate as 
too expansive or have misapplied the reasoning.181  The mixed reception 
                                                                                                                                     
availability of the highway.” Therefore, merely because the existence of illegal content 
was facilitated by the presence of a neutral conduit, that is not enough to hold that 
conduit responsible for “development” of information.) 
 173 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 174 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1171–72. 
 175 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121, 1125. 
 176 Id. at 1121–22. 
 177 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1171–72. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 1171. 
 180 FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–1200 (10th Cir. 2009); Goddard v. 
Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196–1201 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Certain Approval 
Programs, L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., No. CV08-1608-PHX-NVW, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22318 at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9, 2009). 
 181 See Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725 (N.D. Ohio 2007). (SexSearch 
was decided after the initial Ninth Circuit ruling in Roommate and the court in SexSearch 
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of Roommate by courts is interesting when the interpretation of the CDA 
is traced back to Zeran v. AOL, the seminal case on the subject.182  The 
Fourth Circuit merely sought to define the traditional jobs of a publisher 
that the CDA intended to immunize, and to set forth the proposition that 
whether a Web site would be considered a distributor or a publisher at 
common law, that distinction is immaterial under the CDA, as both 
would be immunized for doing the traditional jobs of a publisher.183  
Following that interpretation, the Ninth Circuit did not grant 
Roommate.com immunity because it actively created users’ profiles and 
solicited discriminatory information that led to alleged violations of the 
Fair Housing Act and California’s anti-discrimination laws.184  
Roommate.com was not a neutral conduit, but rather an information 
content provider itself because it helped develop the allegedly 
discriminatory information.185 
V. PROPOSED TEST 
A. Introduction of New Test 
A more comprehensive test is needed that will work in conjunction 
with the Roommate reasoning, and expand upon that analysis in order to 
halt the dissemination of sweeping immunity.  The appropriate test 
should utilize the Roommate standard when determining whether an 
entity is an information content provider, and a new test should be 
adopted to ensure that the claims at issue fall within the ambit of the 
CDA, so as to grant immunity to Web sites for these claims.  Under the 
proposed test, the court should consider the collective effect of the nature 
of the interactive computer service, the claim(s) at issue, and the 
underlying facts alleged.186  This new test will build upon the test 
                                                                                                                                     
relied on the analysis of Carafano instead of Roommate, which may have been one of the 
reasons why the Circuit refused to consider the district court’s holding granting CDA 
immunity.). See also Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 961, 968–69 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(Dart was decided after the en banc ruling in Roommate and actually used Roommate as 
precedent in the opinion to draw a comparison between the open-ended “Additional 
Comments” sections in Roommate and the structure of Craigslist’s service, providing 
categories and subcategories. The court found that the aforementioned aspects of the 
website were akin to one another. The court further found that the word search tool 
provided by Craigslist was a “neutral tool” under the reasoning of Roommate.). 
 182 Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327(4th Cir. 1997). 
 183 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–34. 
 184 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1164–68. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2008). The implementation 
of this test is somewhat supported by the Circuit court in SexSearch. Although the Circuit 
court did not rule on whether SexSearch would be immune from suit under the 
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advanced in Roommate that looked for Web sites that help “to develop 
unlawful content” and to “contribute materially to the alleged illegality 
of the conduct.”187  More importantly, this test will place the Roommate 
inquiry into the larger scheme of promoting use of the Internet, while 
setting some important guidelines.  
B. Elements of the Test 
1. The Nature of the Interactive Computer Service 
The cases concerning CDA immunity have presented a vast array of 
Web sites that target different types of people and activities.188  Some are 
Web sites that many would consider to be harmless, whereas some, such 
as SexSearch and the “Erotic Services”189 section of Craigslist, are 
sexually explicit Web sites that facilitate prostitution and the exploitation 
of minors. Courts should consider the nature of a specific Web site as 
one factor when determining whether to grant immunity for a specific 
claim, because different societal concerns flow from different Web sites. 
This part of the analysis should determine whether or not the Web 
site at issue is solely an interactive computer service provider or both an 
interactive computer service provider and an information content 
provider based on the Roommate test.  However, the test should be 
altered somewhat to allow for a broader definition of information content 
provider for Web sites that encourage illegal or risky behavior and could 
easily lead to such behavior based upon the information asked for by the 
Web site.  The content of the material requested by the Web site would 
thus pose a higher burden on Web sites such as SexSearch and the 
                                                                                                                                     
Communications Decency Act, it did say that it refused to accept the district court’s 
analysis of the CDA because it “would read § 230 more broadly than any previous Court 
of Appeals decision has read it, potentially abrogating all state- or common-law causes of 
action brought against interactive Internet services.”  The Circuit Court suggests that the 
district court should have provided a more thorough analysis into the type of claim set 
forth. 
 187 Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1168. 
 188 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (involving MySpace, 
a social networking website that seeks to build friendships); Universal Commc’n Sys. v. 
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) (involving a website that lists stock prices and 
has a message board that conveys financial information); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving Matchmaker.com, a commercial Internet 
dating service); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) (involving an AOL 
chatroom); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving an AOL 
bulletin board); Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(involving a portion of Yahoo! dedicated to dating). 
 189 Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Craigslist has 
changed the name from “Erotic Services” to “Adult Services.”). 
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“Erotic Services” section of Craigslist because of the overarching policy 
concerns that stem from sexually related Web sites. 
The imposition of a higher burden on sexually related Web sites is 
likely to be met with First Amendment concerns.  For example, 
SexSearch would argue that although its Web site may be unsavory, it is 
completely lawful when used by consenting adults and as such, holding 
the Web site to a higher burden violates the Constitution.  However, this 
higher burden would only be applied when the court considers the nature 
of the Web site, along with the underlying facts and claims at issue, and 
the balancing as a whole calls for a higher burden.  In SexSearch, the 
plaintiff was suing the Web site for allowing minors to access the Web 
site and participate in active sex solicitations.190  The claim was not 
attacking the nature of the Web site generally, but rather focusing on the 
specific concerns involving the nature of the website when used by 
minors.191  In a case concerning consenting adults, such as a defamation 
claim against SexSearch, the higher burden would not be imposed on the 
Web site because the underlying facts and claims do not demand such a 
burden.  Therefore, a heightened burden would only be applied in a small 
amount of cases, where sexually natured Web sites are not instilling the 
safety of their Web sites.  This test is thus sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to avoid the curtailment of free speech while promoting other important 
societal interests.192 
2. The Claims Alleged and Their Underlying Facts 
The second part of the analysis should focus on the claims brought 
by plaintiff.  Based on prior case law, if the claims relate a Web site’s 
alleged security, the court should not generally hold Web sites liable for 
their actions if they are trying to self-police or work as a publisher.  
Security in this context refers to Web sites proclaiming that they will 
ensure that their users abide by all the rules implemented by them.  This 
expansive protection given to Web sites has been stretched too far and 
needs to be subject to one main limitation. Courts should hold that if the 
Web site proclaims that it will police its material, and it fails to provide 
such security, then it should be held responsible for those 
                                                                                                                                     
 190 Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723–24 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Compare U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 803 (2000) (The Court 
found that 47 U.S.C.S. § 561 violated the First Amendment because it was not the least 
restrictive alternative available. The statute required cable operators to either fully block 
channels reserved for adult programming or to “time channel” the programming, limiting 
the transmission to hours when children were unlikely to be viewing. The Court found 
that there was a less restrictive alternative, to allow viewers to order signal blocking on a 
household-by-household basis.) 
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representations.  Otherwise, this amounts to a misrepresentation by the 
Web site that encourages users to trust and rely upon the Web sites’ 
representations. Under this proposed limitation, Web sites are still 
encouraged to self-police.  However, Web sites are not encouraged to tell 
their users that they are self-policing, when in fact they are not policing 
at all or are doing so in a negligent fashion. 
Advocates of the broad interpretation of the CDA would likely 
consider this part of the proposed test to be a revival of the distinction 
between publisher and distributor liability at common law.193  Although 
this part of the test does limit the representations of Web sites to actually 
be grounded in the actions they undertake to self-police their Web sites, 
it does not completely revert the state of the law to that of a pre-CDA 
society.  Rather, it “revives” the holding in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co. and applies it in a very narrow context.194  The 
Stratton court held that a Web site representing itself as self-policed was 
responsible for its content.195  This proposition would only be applied 
when the other two elements of the proposed test are met—when the 
nature of the website is dangerous, and the underlying events and facts 
are so heinous as to call for heightened scrutiny of the Web site’s 
representations.  Under the proposed test, the limited use of the Stratton 
holding would not require a court to find a Web site liable based on the 
facts in Stratton: the plaintiffs brought suit against Prodigy because a 
third party had posted defamatory statements about the plaintiffs’ 
business and personal motives.196  Using the proposed test, Prodigy 
would be found immune from suit despite its representations ensuring the 
safety of its Web site because the facts and underlying claims of the case 
do not mandate a heightened level of scrutiny.  On the other hand, 
SexSearch and Dart mandate a heightened level of scrutiny because of 
their security misrepresentations, the egregious underlying facts and 
claims in the cases, and the nature of their Web site. 
Furthermore, the revival of Stratton’s holding is permissible 
because at the time it was abrogated by the CDA, the CDA sought to 
promote the growth of the Internet above all other costs.197  Today, as the 
Internet has flourished exponentially, that policy concern must be 
weighed against the other policy concerns of sexual exploitation of 
                                                                                                                                     
 193 See, e.g., Huycke, supra note 37, at 583–84. 
 194 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 21063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 229 at *6–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 195 Id. at *10-11. 
 196 Id. at *1-2. 
 197 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2) (2009); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–
28 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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minors and prostitution.198  Although the balancing of these policy 
interests may be more suited for Congress, the courts can no languish as 
more atrocious scenarios unfold from the lack of accountability held by 
Web sites.  The courts must use judicial interpretation to reconcile the 
CDA with other pieces of legislation from Congress, regarding issues 
such as the sexual exploitation of minors and prostitution.  Therefore, the 
use of the holding in Stratton is so narrow that it should not be 
considered Stratton’s revival, but rather a necessary utilization of old 
legal principles applied to effectuate important policy considerations in a 
new and more dangerous world. 
This suggested limitation would seek to abolish the arbitrary line 
drawn in Mazur v. eBay, in which the court held that eBay was immune 
from some of its representations to its users, but not for others.199  In that 
case, the district court held that eBay was immune regarding its site’s 
representations , which stated that it used “reputable” auction houses and 
screened them before using them.200  The court explained that these 
assertions were akin to a traditional publisher’s role because deciding 
whether to include a live auction house when screening is similar to 
deciding whether to publish.201  In contrast, the court held that eBay’s 
affirmative representations that the Web site was “safe” may still be 
actionable.202  The court reasoned that eBay made the statements that the 
Web site was “safe” of its own volition, without using any comments or 
feedback provided by users.203  As such, the court found that eBay was 
the speaker of those statements.204  The court’s distinction between the 
plaintiff’s two claims turned on semantics and thereby exhibits the need 
to hold Web sites liable when they make affirmative representations 
about their own safety features.  The holding from this case potentially 
provides confusion when applying it to different sets of facts.205 
                                                                                                                                     
 198 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164, n.15 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 199 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16561 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008). 
 200 Id. at *28–30. 
 201 Id. at *28–29. 
 202 Id. at *29–33 (The court further stated that the statements that eBay included in its 
Live Auction User Agreement were not enough to overcome this representation of safety. 
These statements included that eBay “1) only provides a venue; 2) is not involved in the 
actual transaction between buyer and seller; and 3) does not guarantee any of the goods 
offered in any auction. Specifically, eBay is ‘solely a passive conduit’ and ‘not an auction 
house,’ it is ‘not conducting the live auctions’ and it does not have control over the 
‘quality, safety or legality of the items advertised.’”). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See Mazur, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 16561 at *34–35. (The confusion of this 
holding is exemplified in the Mazur court’s characterization of SexSearch. When 
analyzing whether the affirmative representations made by eBay should be actionable, the 
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When considering the claims at issue, the court should also analyze 
the underlying facts that support those claims.  In the majority of the 
cases in which courts have granted CDA immunity, the defendant was 
sued for tort claims such as defamation or libel, with the underlying facts 
alleging that the Web site should be held responsible for the injurious 
content provided by another.206  The application of CDA immunity in 
reference to cases involving underlying facts like fulfills congressional 
intent because those cases sought to hold an interactive computer service 
liable as a publisher or speaker of the claims.  However, Congress did 
not intend to allow Web sites immunity from all suits based on all kinds 
of underlying facts, no matter how egregious.  This intent can be gleaned 
from specific statements within the CDA. First, Congress only meant for 
immunity to be extended when interactive computer services were being 
treated as “publishers” or “speakers” of third party information.207  
Congress did not intend to immunize Web sites for all of their activities, 
including serving as gatekeepers responsible for ensuring the safety of 
their Web sites and the truthfulness of their own assertions. 
Second, Congress has explicitly stated that CDA immunity should 
not be extended to alleged violations of criminal law.208  Although this 
exception to CDA immunity is included to prevent the granting of 
immunity when a Web site faces criminal charges, the policy behind the 
exception should be interpreted broadly.  The policy should be read so 
that courts should not grant immunity when a Web site actively 
participates in a criminal wrong.  Specifically, the statute enumerates 
crimes related to obscenity and the sexual exploitation of children.209  
                                                                                                                                     
court distinguished this case from SexSearch. The court said that the granting of 
immunity in SexSearch was not applicable here for three reasons. First, the court 
reasoned that in SexSearch, defendant’s statements about its users were a regurgitation of 
its users’ representations. Second, the court noted that in Mazur, eBay did not present 
evidence of safety assurances that it received from HJA, whereas SexSearch presented 
the Terms of Conditions that stated that SexSearch was not liable for third party content. 
Finally, the court set forth that the plaintiff in SexSearch knew of the safeguards that the 
website provided, whereas the plaintiff in this case did not. However the court’s analysis 
was a mischaracterization because in both cases, the statements about defendant’s 
website were related to the information provided by the website’s users, there were 
Terms and Conditions agreements in both cases where the defendant’sWeb sites 
disclaimed liability, and in both cases, the plaintiffs knew of the safeguards of the 
website.) 
 206 See, e.g., Universal Commn’c Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(suing for defamation); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (suing for 
defamation); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (suing for 
defamation); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 
2000) (suing for defamation and negligence). 
 207 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2009). 
 208 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2009). 
 209 Id. 
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Therefore, sexually related crimes should be held to a heightened burden 
when seeking immunity.  Congress has made numerous efforts to prevent 
such crimes from occurring through the Internet, and those efforts should 
be considered when courts determine whether to grant Web sites 
immunity.210  This test seeks to place more responsibility on interactive 
computer services that are being sued based on crimes of a sexual nature. 
C. Application of the Test 
1. Interactive Service Provider 
The natures of SexSearch and the “Erotic Services” section of 
Craigslist require the use of heightened scrutiny when seeking to apply 
CDA immunity. SexSearch is a Web site that offers an online adult 
dating service.211  The main goal of SexSearch is for its users to meet one 
another and engage in sexual acts.212  The outcome that SexSearch seeks 
is more dangerous than the outcome from other social networking sites 
that courts have compared it to, such as Yahoo! Personals and Yahoo! 
Premier,213 MySpace,214 or Matchmaker.215  In Doe v. SexSearch, the 
court barred as immune the assertion that defendant should be liable 
because a minor was permitted to be on its Web site.216  The court 
analogized the claim in SexSearch to the claim in Doe v. MySpace, in 
which the court held that arguing for failure to implement safety 
procedures for minors really meant that plaintiff was seeking to hold 
MySpace liable for its actions as a publisher of third party information.217 
                                                                                                                                     
 210 The statutory history of Congress’s attempts to help curb the sexual exploitations 
of minors on the internet is outside the scope of this note. See John Nisbett, Comment, 
Checkmate: How Sexual Predators in (Your)Space Have Strategically Employed Existing 
Cyber-Laws to Outflank Their Prey, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 181, 191–96 (2009) (outlining 
the history of Congress’s initiative.); Sandra J.C. van der Heide, Note, Social Networking 
and Sexual Predators: The Case of Self-Regulation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 173, 
183–86 (2008) (explaining COPA and Deleting Online Predators Act of 2007 
(“DOPA”)); Groppe, supra note 13, at 229–37 (outlining the statutes that have been 
passed and the pending statutes.). 
 211 Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 725 (The court compared the facts of this case to the facts in Anthony v. 
Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006), which involved a section of Yahoo! 
that served as a dating service.). 
 214 Id. at 727 (The court compared the facts of this case to the facts in Doe v. 
MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d. 843, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2007).). 
 215 Id. at 725–26. (The court also compared the facts of this case to the facts in 
Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F. 3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).). 
 216 Id. at 727–28. 
 217 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
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Although the two claims are similar, the distinction that can be 
drawn between them is the difference between the Web sites at issue. 
MySpace is a social networking website that allows users to create 
profiles, which include personal information and information about their 
lives and their interests.218  MySpace allows users to extend “friend 
invitations” to other users and to communicate with them.219  The basic 
idea behind MySpace is to allow users to build friendships.220  This idea 
runs counter to the idea behind SexSearch. Although both Web sites 
could be termed “social networking sites,”221 the social networking 
intended to occur on MySpace varies greatly from that activities intended 
to occur via SexSearch; the former provides a platform for seeking 
friendships while the latter encourages people to seek sex.222  The Web 
sites’ respective age requirements further illustrate the distinction 
between their natures: while MySpace conditions membership on 
individuals being fourteen years-old or older, SexSearch mandates that 
users are eighteen years or older.223  If these restrictions were enforced 
and only adults were present on the Web site, then the activities of 
SexSearch would be entirely legal. 
The interactive computer service in Dart is of a similar nature to the 
one in SexSearch.  The interactive computer service in Dart is a 
subcategory of Craigslist, “Erotic Services.”224  Plaintiff, Sheriff Dart, 
argued that this section of the Web site induced individuals to post 
listings advertising prostitution.225  In support of his claim, he provided 
statistics of how many arrests were effectuated from content posted on 
Craigslist, and he submitted examples of some of the advertisements 
found.226  Craigslist countered this argument by citing various services 
covered by the “Erotic Services” category that did not implicate 
prostitution.227 
                                                                                                                                     
 218 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 415–16. 
 221 MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 845–46 (“The idea of online social networking is that 
members will use their online profiles to become part of an online community of people 
with common interests.”). 
 222 MySpace, 528 F.3d at 415–16; Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (N.D. 
Ohio 2007). 
 223 MySpace, 528 F. 3d at 416; SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 723. 
 224 Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (The name of the 
subsection was later changed to “Adult Services.”). 
 225 Id. at 962. 
 226 Id. at 962–63. 
 227 Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that the “Erotic 
Services” section included advertisements for “legal escort services, massage workers, 
[and] exotic dancers”). 
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The dangerousness of this section of Craigslist is not a secret.  On 
April 14, 2009, the peril of the website became public when the 
“Craigslist killer” murdered a young woman named Julissa Brisman.228  
The killer met up with Brisman in response to a masseuse advertisement 
she placed within Craigslist’s “Erotic Services” category.229  For a few 
years prior to Brisman’s murder, many attorneys general were fighting 
Craigslist to implement more effective safety procedures.230  Although 
Craigslist installed some rudimentary safety procedures to appease the 
attorneys general, such procedures were not sufficient to prevent 
Brisman’s murder.231  After the murder, Craigslist changed the name of 
the “Erotic Services” category to “Adult Services” within the United 
States.232  Craigslist Chief Executive Officer Jim Buckmaster also 
claimed that the postings in that category undergo consistent manual 
review.233  Despite Buckmaster’s claims, many skeptics argue that the 
“Adult Services” section provides a forum for the exact same type of 
content that existed within the “Erotic Services” section.234  The 
dangerousness of this section is demonstrated by a horrific murder, and 
the safety procedures that have been installed fail to deter the sexual 
exploitation and prostitution that is still occurs.  Despite the fact that 
Brisman was intentionally advertising sexual services on the Web site, 
Craigslist still should have intervened and prevented the solicitation of 
sexual services on its Web site. 
This portion of the Web site is similar to SexSearch in promoting 
sexually dangerous activities.  Although there may be some legal 
advertisements posted under this section, the title of the section implies 
the existence of illicit material.  This category can be distinguished from 
other categories on the Web site,235 based on the type of content included 
                                                                                                                                     
 228 Maureen Orth, Killer @ Craigslist, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2009 at 156; Aaron C. 
Davis, Craigslist Vows to Improve Monitoring of ‘Adult’ Ads, WASH. POST, May 14, 
2009, at A03. 
 229 Orth, supra note 224 at 156; Davis, supra note 224 at A03. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. (In November 2008, “the attorneys general got Craigslist to toughen its rules by 
requiring a working landline or proper cell phone, a valid credit card, an e-mail address, 
and an I.P. address that can be traced back to the individual from everyone placing a 
posting on Erotic Services.”) 
 232 Id.; Brad Stone, Craigslist to Remove ‘Erotic’ Ads, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009 at 1; 
Davis, supra note 224. 
 233 Orth, supra note 224; Stone, supra note 228; Davis, supra note 224. 
 234 Orth, supra note 224; Davis, supra note 224 (Inspector Brian Bray, who oversees 
the D.C. police department’s prostitution unit said “I believe it’ll just transfer [the 
prostitution postings] over under a different name.”) 
 235 Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (listing other 
examples of Craigslist’s categories and subcategories as “community,” “personals,” 
“discussion forums,” “housing,” “for sale,” “services,” and “jobs.”). 
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in each category and the connotations surrounding the categories.  Like 
SexSearch, the subcategory of “Erotic Services” requires that an 
individual must be eighteen years-old to use the service, further 
exhibiting the adult nature of the website.236  Because of the foreseeable 
content of the information available under “Erotic Services” and the 
foreseeable behavior that will result from interactions on SexSearch, the 
courts should hold these Web sites to a higher burden in order to qualify 
for CDA immunity. 
In addition to considering the nature of the Web site, the court 
should also look at the amount of development and solicitation of 
information that the Web site engaged in.  Under the proposed test, the 
courts should be more willing to characterize SexSearch and Craigslist as 
information content providers.  Using the Roommates standard, it can be 
argued that both of these Web sites have solicited the information 
provided by third parties.  The layout of each of these Web sites falls 
somewhere on the Roomates sliding scale between the users’ profiles and 
the “Additional Comments” section of Roommates.com.237  Although the 
Web sites did not create discriminatory question and answer choices as 
Roommates.com did, the purpose of each of these Web sites encouraged 
individuals to provide information that would lead to sexual relations, 
whether consensual or not.238  The formats of SexSearch and Craigslist 
lend themselves less toward granting immunity than does the “Additional 
Comments” section of Roommates.com because of the kind of 
information solicited.  The “Additional Comments” section sought any 
other pertinent information that a roommate may want to provide about 
housing options, whereas the Web sites at issue sought information about 
“Erotic Services” and meeting offline to engage in sexual relations.239  
Looking merely at the type of information solicited and the purposes 
behind acquiring that information, a court should find that there was 
more active solicitation and encouragement from SexSearch and 
Craigslist than from Roommates.com regarding its “Additional 
Comments” section. 
                                                                                                                                     
 236 Craigslist, http://chicago.craigslist.org/ (follow “Adult” hyperlink under the 
“Services” category). (last visited __) 
 237 Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164–74 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 238 Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 961–62; Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 
(N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 239 Compare Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1173, with Dart 665 F. Supp. 2d at 961–62; 
SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 722. 
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2. The Claims and the Underlying Facts 
The claims in SexSearch and Dart warrant a heightened burden to 
receive immunity.  In SexSearch, the relevant claims240 could be boiled 
down to the failure of the website to monitor and exclude minors from 
becoming members.241  Plaintiff’s claims did not center on treating 
SexSearch as a publisher, but rather on the misrepresentations that 
SexSearch engaged in through allowing minors to be present on the 
website.242 
 In Dart, the claim alleged was public nuisance, but it was 
ultimately based on Craigslist soliciting and facilitating prostitution.243  
These failure-to-monitor and solicitation/facilitation claims occurred in 
both cases despite the mechanisms in place to ensure that users of the 
Web sites were at least eighteen years-old.244  SexSearch and Craigslist 
represented to its users that the Web sites were free from minors and 
                                                                                                                                     
 240 SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d. at 723–24 (relevant claims include breach of contract, 
fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, failure to 
warn, and deceptive trade practice and unfair and deceptive acts in violation of the Ohio 
Consumer Sales Practices Act). 
 241 Id. at 724. 
 242 See Doe v. SexSearch, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 604, 2-5 (N.D. Ohio May 18, 
2007). SexSearch can be analogized to Anthony v. Yahoo!, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259–
60 (N.D. Cal. 2006), in which Yahoo! operated a dating website that was alleged to have 
engaged in fraud. Plaintiff claimed that Yahoo! created false profiles of individuals and 
additionally, sent profiles of actual subscribers who were no longer members to other 
users to entice them to continue their subscriptions. Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1259–60. 
In SexSearch, the court considered plaintiff’s reliance on Anthony and rejected it because 
the claims at issue did not center on fraudulent profiles that were created by the 
interactive service provider. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 725. The SexSearch court, 
however, did not address the second holding in Anthony, that CDA immunity was 
unavailable for Yahoo!’s use of the profiles of former users because “Yahoo!’s manner of 
presenting the profiles – not the underlying profiles themselves – constitute[d] fraud.” 
Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. Although the facts are somewhat different, the 
rationale from Anthony about the former members’ profiles can be imputed to SexSearch. 
In SexSearch, plaintiff sought to impose liability on SexSearch based on its 
accompanying misrepresentations of age and the way in which SexSearch presented the 
profiles – that all of its users were at least 18 years old. 
 243 Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 963. 
 244 Id. at 961–62 (users posting on the Craigslist website under any category must 
agree to abide by the “Terms and Conditions” which prohibit posting unlawful content. 
Users posting in the “Erotic” category also receive an additional “warning and 
disclaimer” stating that users agree to report any illegal content that they find with the 
section, including the “solicitation of prostitution”); see also Craigslist, 
http://chicago.craigslist.org/ (follow “Adult” hyperlink under the “Services” category) 
(requiring users to represent that they are at least 18 years old.); SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 
2d at 723 (users posting on SexSearch must agree to the Terms and Conditions and the 
profile guidelines, which indicate that all persons are 18 years or older. Users are also 
required to check a box affirming that they are at least 18 years old). 
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prostitution, respectively, and thus, the Web sites should be held to those 
representations. 
Although the specific claims brought against each Web site may 
seem like other cases in which courts have granted immunity to 
interactive computer services, the claims in SexSearch and Dart can be 
distinguished from the majority of these cases based on their underlying 
facts.  SexSearch and Dart are both based on criminal wrongs—statutory 
rape and prostitution, respectively245—as opposed to the numerous cases 
that have dealt with civil wrongs, such as defamation and libel.  
Furthermore, it is immaterial that the plaintiff in SexSearch was an adult 
male who sued SexSearch after engaging in sexual relations with a minor 
female.  The plaintiff’s claims were still based on an exploitation of a 
minor that occurred as a result of the representations of SexSearch.  This 
case could have easily been flipped around with the female suing the 
Web site, and based on the reasoning of the SexSearch court, her claims 
would have also failed.  Therefore, the policy reasons behind holding 
Web sites to a higher standard when criminal wrongs are alleged are 
enormous.  Specifically, the importance of curbing sexual crimes calls 
for imposing a heightened burden on Web sites that are accused of 
facilitating these criminal wrongs.246 
The proposed test essentially boils down to considering all the facts 
presented and balancing different public policies and societal goals.  In 
the case of sexually related Web sites, such as SexSearch and Craigslist’s 
“Erotic Services” category, the potential danger that stems from the 
information solicited by these Web sites is enormous.  In considering the 
nature of these Web sites, the claims at issue, and the underlying facts, 
the courts should have applied a less rigid test; they should have 
ultimately determined that SexSearch and the “Erotic Services” category 
of Craigslist are information content providers and thus, not entitled to 
immunity for the claims brought against them. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the inception of the CDA, courts have sought to apply § 
230(c)(1) broadly to grant immunity to a Web site whenever a Web site 
merely portrayed content provided by a third party.  When the CDA was 
passed, this attitude towards broad immunity was appropriate, but over 
the years, as the Internet has expanded exponentially, the idea of broad 
immunity seems to be less necessary.  Regardless of this lack of 
                                                                                                                                     
 245 SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. at 721; Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 962–63. 
 246 See Nisbett, supra note 206; van der Heide, supra note 206; Groppe, supra note 
13s. 
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necessity, most courts are still blindly implementing the concept of 
robust immunity.  There has been a backlash though, through a few court 
cases and some scholarly dissent.  Roommate served as the seminal case 
that could stand for the potential downfall of the CDA immunity 
stronghold. 
Specifically, SexSearch and Dart have exhibited the need to reform 
the application of CDA immunity, at least in reference to Web sites and 
claims of a sexual nature.  This need can be satisfied by extending the 
principles announced in Roommate through a fact intensive inquiry that 
creates a higher threshold for Web sites to meet in order to avoid being 
considered information content providers.  This approach will in effect 
make obtaining immunity for Web sites of a sexually explicit or 
dangerous nature more difficult depending on the claims and facts 
alleged, but will leave more generic Web sites with the same outcome as 
they would have received before this test was created.  This approach 
will also make acquiring immunity more difficult if the claims and 
underlying facts are based on criminal wrongs or wrongs associated with 
misrepresentations by Web sites.  However, the truly passive interactive 
computer services should survive this new test unscathed.  All claims are 
not created equal and therefore should not be treated equally.  
A fact intensive analysis is necessary to obtain just results in every 
case that seeks to invoke the CDA.  This analysis will consider the nature 
of the website, the claims, and the underlying facts together to determine 
what level of scrutiny should be applied.  This test will likely end the 
“lawless” nature of the Internet and instill more order into an area where 
the courts seem to have followed blindly and unintentionally expanded 
immunity, one case at a time. 
